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Abstract 
Many resources  such  as supercomputers,  legal advisors,  and university classrooms  are 
shared  by  many members of  an organization. When the  supply of shared  resources  is 
limited, conflict usually results  between contending demanders.  If these  conflicts can be 
adequately  resolved, then value is created  for the  organization. In this paper  we use the 
methodology  of  applied  mechanism  design  to  examine  alternative  processes  for  the 
resolution of such conflicts for a particular class of scheduling problems.  We construct a 
laboratory  environment, within which  we  evaluate  the  outcomes  of various  allocation 
mechanisms. In particular,  we  are  able to  measure efficiency, the  value attained by the 
resulting  allocations  as  a  percentage  of  the  maximum possible  value.  Our  choice  of 
environment and parameters  is guided by a specific  application, the allocation  of time on 
NASA's  Deep  Space  Network,  but  the  results  also  provide  insights relevant to  other 
scheduling and  allocation applications.  We  find (1)  experienced user committees using 
decision  support  algorithms  produce  reasonably  efficient  allocations  in  lower  conflict 
situations but perform badly when there is a high level of conflict between demanders, (2) 
there  is  a  mechanism, called  the  Adaptive User  Selection Mechanism (AUSM),  which 
charges users for time and yields high efficiencies in high conflict situations but, because of 
the  prices  paid,  in which the net surplus available to the  users  is less  than that resulting 
from  the  inefficient user  committee (a  reason  why  users  may  not  appreciate  'market 
solutions' to organization problems) and (3) there  is a  modification of AUSM in which 
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tokens, or internal money, replaces real money, which results in highly efficient  allocations 
without extracting any of the users' surplus. Although the distribution of surplus  is still an 
issue, the significant increase in efficiency provides users with a strong incentive to replace 
inefficient user committees with the more efficient AUSM. 
JEL classification:  C92 
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1. Introduction 
Typically, shared resources are centrally financed and managed by an organiza- 
tion  and  used  in  various  ways  and  intensities  by  diverse  members  of  that 
organization.  Examples of such resources include  supercomputers, observatories, 
motor pools, legal advisors, lab facilities, etc ....  i The methods and processes by 
which shared resources are allocated often evolve in a common pattern. We offer 
our stylized version here.  In the beginning,  the resource is proposed by potential 
users, designed by engineers, and financed and managed by bureaucrats. Many of 
these actors have a political stake in the performance and utility of the resources: 
thus,  they  want  to  keep  control.  The  initial  management  structure  is  often  a 
combination of user committees and bureaucratic responsibility. As long as desired 
use  is  not  much  larger  than  capacity,  committee  meetings  and  bureaucratic 
negotiation  can  usually  overcome what  little  conflicts  may arise  in  determining 
who  gets  what  use  of  the  shared  facility.  However,  increases  in  demand  or 
decreases  in  usable  capacity can  easily lead  to  congestion  in  the  system and  to 
contentious non-negotiable conflicts among users. If it is not possible, or is costly 
to expand the resources, the next step usually involves asking users  and bureau- 
crats  to  streamline  their  decision  processes.  Decision  Support  Teams  are  often 
summoned to help facilitate the process. They provide computer programs (some- 
times involving various voting mechanisms) which  are intended  to  speed up the 
existing processes. Using valuation and resource requirement information provided 
by the  users,  the  algorithms  may heuristically  solve  very complex  optimization 
problems in an attempt to compute good allocations. Unfortunately, these support 
programs tend to ignore the fact that users have incentives to bias the information 
they provide to the algorithm in order to achieve more favorable allocations. The 
new support systems work faster but congestion remains as much of a problem as 
before. Value is foregone. 
i Another similar class of situations includes resources managed by the government for the private 
sector such  as  the  electromagnetic spectrum managed by  the  FCC  and  airports  managed by  local 
governments. Virtually  everything in  this  paper  applies to  these publicly  managed  assets.  See  for 
example Bykowsky et al. (1995) for related work on the FCC spectrum problem. J.O. Ledyard et aL / Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192  165 
At this point, in desperation, economists are sometimes called for advice. Their 
usual response is  'auction it off' or 'price it at marginal cost', forgetting at least 
two facts that lead users to ignore the economists' advice. First,  users who have 
been getting something for nothing will now have to pay to obtain an allocation. 
Thus, even if allocative efficiency improves and value increases, the users can be 
worse off because the bureaucracy may capture more in rents than the increase in 
the  value  of the  allocations.  So the  users  will  use  whatever political  clout they 
have to block these  'economic solutions'. Second, even if the political resistance 
can  be  overcome, for example  by the  use  of grandfathered  allocations, 2  these 
scheduling problems can involve significant non-convexities which cause prices to 
be unable to function as coordinating devices. Thus even if the economists' advice 
is taken seriously, the results may be less than satisfactory and yield allocations no 
better for users than current processes are producing (see Banks et al.,  1989). 
In this paper we explore a different approach to finding solutions for congestion 
in  shared  resources:  applied  mechanism  design.  (See  Ledyard  (1993)  for  a 
summary of the  approach.) We argue that new processes can be designed which 
improve  upon  congested  user  committees  and  other  regulatory  administrative 
procedures. The constraints on the design process, in addition to those familiar to 
economists such as incentive compatibility and budget balancing, include limits on 
the computational capability of any algorithm used and political constraints which 
must be satisfied if the mechanism is to be acceptable to the parties involved as a 
replacement  to  current  procedures.  This  approach  to  the  design  of new  mecha- 
nisms is ideally pursued by the combination of theorists, who can analyze some of 
the properties of an allocation mechanism, and experimental economists, who use 
the laboratory to test the performance and refine the procedures for demonstration 
and  actual  use.  When  theoretical  knowledge  is  not  sufficient  to  describe  the 
behavior  of  individuals  in  a  mechanism  in  the  environment  under  study,  the 
economist  can  still  create  new  mechanisms,  the  choice  guided  by  theoretical 
intuition and previous empirical evidence from other environments. The laboratory 
can then be used to test and improve the performance of the new mechanism in an 
environment based on the field application of interest.  This approach to design is 
similar  in  spirit  to  the  aircraft  designer  who  uses  wind  tunnels  to  create  new 
airplanes. 
In  this  paper,  we  report  the  results  from  a  set  of  experiments  designed  to 
provide  a  testbed  and  a  demonstration  of  proof  of  concept.  We  based  our 
experiments  on  a  systematic  study  of a  specific  shared  resource  problem,  the 
allocation of tracking time of NASA's worldwide Deep Space Network (DSN) of 
antennas. While one may or may not be interested in the DSN allocation problem, 
2 An interesting example of this can be found in Riker and Sened (1991) based on work of Grether 
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the approach we take and the results of our performance tests have a wide range of 
application to scheduling and other allocation problems. 
Our  approach  is  straightforward  to  replicate.  We  first  try  to  extract  those 
elements of the situation that are most relevant to the mechanism design problem. 
For  the  DSN  problem,  we  report  this  aspect  of our  research  in  Section  2  and 
Section 3 below. Using these historical and theoretical analyses, we then create a 
class of environments, our wind  tunnel  parameters, within  which  to test various 
organization designs. Next, we try to construct an experimentally testable version 
of the current process as a benchmark against which to test new designs. Then we 
create,  being guided by relevant theory and experimental evidence,  new  mecha- 
nisms  which  we  think  will  solve  the  allocation  problem.  Finally,  we  test  the 
mechanisms  in  the  environments.  At  this  point  we  can  eliminate  designs  with 
obviously poor performance and can fine tune the procedures (including  stopping 
rules, information structures, etc.) for the designs that seem promising. The results 
of this  experimental  analysis  are  contained  in  Section  6.  We  conclude  with  a 
summary of lessons learned. 
We turn now to the details. 
2. A  little background 
The Deep Space Network is a worldwide network of antennas managed by the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) for NASA. The network is used to provide uplink 
and downlink communication with  spacecraft in  deep space. There are currently 
ten flight projects in deep space using the network, four ground based radio/radar 
astronomy projects  and  maintenance  activities,  three  planned  missions,  and  five 
pre-planning stage missions which will require use of the antennas. The antennas 
are  located  at  three  different  locations,  allowing  for  continuous  tracking  of  a 
spacecraft,  and  there  are three  types  of antennas  (34  meter High  Efficiency,  34 
meter beam  waveguide,  and  70  meter)  at  each  location.  Each  antenna  may be 
directed  to at most one user at a  time.  Demand varies greatly among users  and 
across their lifetimes. For example, the Voyager and Pioneer missions are over 15 
years  old,  have  completed  their  prime  missions,  and  are  now  in  an  extended 
mission  mode  at  the  outer reaches  of our solar  system;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Galileo mission to Jupiter and Ulysses solar polar mission are still en route to their 
prime targets. In addition, demands are interrelated since the goal of the organiza- 
tion is overall mission success. Therefore, scheduling in this environment is a very 
dynamic process. 
Scheduling  of the  antenna time has  been facilitated by the  use of a  decision 
support system and a series of user committees. There are currently the equivalent 
of 15  full time employees involved in constructing  and updating time schedules, 
which  tentatively  assign  each  antenna  beginning  ten  years  in  advance.  For two 
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edited  until  the  date  scheduled.  Heuristic  look  ahead  algorithms  help  with  the 
provision of initial  schedules  and  aid  long-term planning.  However,  despite  the 
amount  of resources  used  in  the  scheduling  process,  there  remains  widespread 
contention  for  resources  and  significant  amounts  of  committee  time  used  to 
resolve  schedule  conflicts.  Recently,  some  effort  has  been  made  to  commit  to 
resource  'allocations'  early so that projects  can plan  well  in  advance.  However, 
there is still  an oversubscription of resources and changes are commonplace. 
3. A theoretical framework 
The DSN  is  an  example  of a  shared  resource.  The  abstract  structure  of the 
allocation problem associated with shared resources is straightforward.  There is a 
set,  X,  of resources  to  be  allocated.  Examples  include  time  on  an  antenna,  a 
computer memory, volume in the bay of a  space  shuttle,  time with a  consultant, 
the  draw  of  power  from  a  shared  battery,  or  broadcasting  over  a  particular 
spectrum band in a  specific geographic area.  There are a  set of potential users of 
these  resources,  I=  {1 ..... n}.  A  feasible  allocation  assigns  a  subset  X; GX  to 
each  i  so that the collection of sets  X 0, X 1  .... X,  is a  partition 3 of  X. In some 
cases  there  are  natural  obvious  partitions,  as  for  example  with  rooms  in  a 
dormitory,  and  in  other cases  there  is  not,  as  in  time  on  an  antenna.  Users  get 
utility  or profits  from each  subset  which  we  denote  ui(xi).  4  We  will  assume 
throughout that a user's total utility is  ui(xi)  -  yi  where  Yi is the money paid to 
receive the use of X i. An efficient feasible allocation  a =  (X I ..... X.) is one such 
that there is no other feasible allocation d  =  (X t' ..... X') such that ~.i=lU(Xi)  >n  i  , 
n  i  32i~ 1U (Xi).  Thus, an efficient allocation solves 
max  Eui(xi)  (1) 
X1''"'X~v  i 
subject to 
n 
Ux, c_x  (2) 
i=1 
and 
X~ N Xj = QV i,j e I.  (3) 
3 U ~_ o Xi =  X  and  X i [7 Xj =~ for all  i,j ~  L  X o is the subset of unassigned resources. 
4 We think of U~(X~) in the DSN problem as the scientific  return to user i from receiving a subset 
of the  resources.  We  suppose that  the  organization,  JPL,  is  interested  in  maximizing the  overall 
scientific  return  from the  resources.  Since  each  user  wants  to  maximize  his  own return,  he  will 
generally want to acquire more resources than he would receive at the organization's optimum. We are 
assuming the  U ~  does not include  any private,  non-scientific benefits to user i, a reasonable assumption 
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If the  ui(.)  were  known,  this  would  be  a  complex  non-linear  computation 
which,  in  principle,  could be solved or approximated.  One  might be tempted to 
simply turn  it  over to  the  operations  research  department.  The  only  difficulties 
would  be  computational complexities.  However,  in  many applications  the  users 
want  to  maximize  their  own  interests  and  not  those  of  the  group.  Therefore, 
getting  accurate  information  on  U i  becomes  a  problem.  Standard  bureaucratic 
processes ask for data on U i  but the distortions created by incentive compatibility 
constraints  may actually lead the  processes to choose  allocations  with ~~.iUi(xi ) 
significantly less than the maximum possible. 
Setting up markets is an alternative often mentioned. One way to do this would 
be to organize a  market for each  x ~  X,  with a  price  p(x) ~  R, so that  i  would 
pay fx, P(x)dx  for the  set  X r  For problems  like  ours,  if a  market equilibrium 
exists,  the  prices  would  support  the  solution.  That  is,  for  all  i  and  all  X[, 
U i( X o) _  fx,  ~  P( x )d x  _> U i(X~) -  fx~ P( x)d x  where  X/~ is the optimal allocation. 
However,if the demands for the items are highly complementary or if serious 
non-convexities  exist,  then  a  simple  set  of  markets  (one  for each  resource)  is 
unlikely to  solve the  problem (see  Koopmans and Beckman,  1957).  In  order to 
discover  and  support  optimal  allocations,  the  price  adjustment  process  requires 
information  about  the  complementarity  of  demands  and  about  the  extent  of 
non-convexities (see Calsamiglia,  1977;  Hurwicz,  1994;  Jordan,  1987;  Saari  and 
Simon,  1978).  In extreme cases one might require price information for all subsets 
of X, rather than only of x  (see Papal,  1994). 
When bureaucratic processes and simple markets will not work very well, some 
success  has  been  realized  using  a  special  type  of ascending  bid  auction.  These 
auction  mechanisms  are  relatively  easy  to  understand  and  achieve  fairly  high 
efficiencies. They are called AUSM (Adaptive User Selection Mechanisms).  The 
basic components of AUSM include: (i) a bid, (A ~k, bi), where  A t c__X and  b ~  R, 
read as  i bids  b i to receive A ik, and (ii) a provisional allocation, (X  0, X I ..... Xn), 
where  X~  is composed of provisionally accepted bids and  X~ =  U k A~k, the union 
of all  x, which  i  receives in the provisional allocation. The ascending bid nature 
of the mechanism comes from the rule which determines whether any new bid is 
to be included in the provisional allocation and which bids are then to be removed. 
This  revision  rule  is  simple:  (A g*, b i*)  is  accepted  if  bi*> ~/~  zb/k  where 
z =  {fk] A/~ ('1 A i*  :~ Q}.  That is  i  must agree to pay at least as much as  those 
who  will  be  displaced  if  i's  bid  is  accepted.  With  this  rule,  the  sum  of  the 
accepted  bids  Y'./kb/k  is  always  increasing.  The  continuous  version  of AUSM 
allows bids  to be submitted at any time with  a  rule  that specifies when  bidding 
stops. This form of the process is computationally simple but it does leave open 
the  possibility  that  users  who  only  want  small  subsets  may  have  difficulty 
displacing  users  who have successfully bid for a  large  subset. This problem has 
been addressed by adding a  standby queue,  described in Banks et al.  (1989)  and 
below in Section 4.2. The queue appears to work reasonably well but it is possible 
that another design would be better. That remains an open question. J.O. Ledyard  et al./ Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192  169 
To summarize, the generic problem facing the mechanism designer for a given 
environment  X  is  to find  a  process  which produces  allocations (partitions)  with 
high values  of EiUi(xi).  For our DSN problem,  X  is  a  collection of heteroge- 
neous items called  slots numbered j  =  1  ..... J  which can be occupied by one and 
only one user. This is a one to many assignment problem. The relevant optimiza- 
tion problem for DSN is  described in  Section 4.3.  We now turn to that  specific 
example of a  shared resource problem. 
4. Our laboratory environment 
4.1. Supply 
The  commodities  to  be  allocated  are  called  slots.  Each  slot  is  completely 
specified  by  a  resource  and  a  time.  Let  S  denote  the  set  of slots  and  s,~ t ~  S 
denote  the  slot  on  resource  m,  at  time  t.  There  are  M  resources  and  T  times, 
where  m =  (1 ..... M)  and  t= (1 ..... T).  The  slots  can  be  represented  by  an 
M￿  matrix  as  in  Fig.  1.  Let  Pj  denote  package  j,  where  PjcS  and  let 
j  =  1  ..... J  where  J=  2 Mr-  1.  Any  collection  of  slots  can  be  considered  a 
package.  In  the  experimental  testbed  we  developed,  M  =  2  and  T=  10  so  that 
there are 20 slots to be allocated and 2 20 -  1 possible packages. This is shown in 
Fig.  1. 
4.2. Demand 
All subjects in the experiments are demanders. There are  I  demanders, denoted 
by  i =  (1 ..... I), each of whom has  a private valuation for each package. Let  V~j 
denote demander  i's valuation for package j. The valuation indicates the monetary 
value  demander  i  will receive if  i  obtains  all  of the  slots  in the package.  V,.j  is 
given in terms of an experimental currency, which is called  'francs'. At the end of 
each  experimental  session,  subjects  are  paid  an  amount  of U.S.  dollars  propor- 
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Fig. 1. Commodity  to be allocated (20 slots). 
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way,  valuations  are  induced,  so  that  subjects  have  a  monetary  incentive  to 
5  maximize the total number of francs they earn. 
In choosing a  set of demanders'  types, or utility functions, we tried to capture 
the general qualities of the requirements of the DSN users, while keeping the types 
simple and the number of types small.  We decided on the following four generic 
types of demand structures. 
1.  Contiguous.  A  contiguous  demander  values  packages  that  are  composed of 
slots at adjacent times on the same resource. Often, users of the DSN require long 
periods  of continuous  coverage  during  important  phases  of  their  mission;  for 
example,  when  mapping  a  planet  or  repairing  an  antenna.  In  the  experiment, 
contiguous demanders  must obtain the  same resource  for  at least two  times  in a 
row to receive any value. Thus, values for contiguous packages are superadditive. 
2.  Periodic.  A  periodic  demander values  packages  that  are composed of times 
separated by a fixed interval on the same resource. Some users of the DSN require 
contact with  their  spacecraft  at  regular  time  intervals.  For example,  Pioneer  10 
must  be  contacted  at  least  once  every  36  hours  to  readjust  its  communications 
equipment  in  order  to  guarantee  future  contact.  In  our  experimental  design, 
periodic  demanders  need  to  use  slots  on  the  same  resource  spaced  at  five  time 
slots apart or otherwise their value is zero. This is an example of nonconvexity in 
the demand structure. 
3.  Array.  An array demander values packages that are composed of slots at the 
same time on multiple resources. Often, it may be desirable to point two antennae 
in the same direction in order to increase the data return rate.  An example of this 
occurs during an encounter when all instruments want to be sending data using the 
70 meter antenna and the 34 meter antennas  at the  same location simultaneously 
allow for a higher data transmission rate with lower error (data loss) rates.  In our 
design,  array demanders require two resources at the same time. 
4.  Maintenance.  A  maintenance  demander values as many single  slot packages 
on resources as he can acquire.  This  is  a  representation  of the preferences  of the 
DSN maintenance  staff who are largely indifferent  about the time  the  antenna  is 
shut down for maintenance. 
One  feature  of  the  information  structure  in  the  DSN  environment  is  the 
common knowledge of the times  of day at each location which can be of use  to 
demanders (all users know when each project is on the same side of the earth as a 
particular  antenna complex).  These times  are referred  to as a  spacecraft  viewpe- 
riod.  In  the  experiments,  each  demander  was  assigned  one  of  two  possible 
5 See Smith (1976) for more on the theory of induced valuation. J.O. Ledyard et al./ Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192  171 
viewperiods, and the number of demanders with each viewperiod was known to all 
subjects. Subjects possessing viewperiods 1 and 2 had a zero valuation for any slot 
in times (columns) 1, 2, 6, or 7 (for viewperiod 1) or in times 4, 5, 9, and 10 (for 
viewperiod 2) respectively. 
In each of our experimental sessions, there were six demanders. Demanders did 
not know the valuations of any other demanders, but they knew that there were a 
total  of three  subjects  possessing  each  viewperiod.  They  also  knew  the  set  of 
possible types, but not the exact valuations which demanders of the various types 
would  have.  Each  demander was  assigned  an  identification  number,  one  of the 
four types discussed above and one of the two possible viewperiods. Fig. 2 relates 
the identification numbers, the types, and the viewperiods. 
4.3. Schedule 
A  schedule  is an assignment of slots to demanders. A  schedule is feasible if it 
satisfies 
and 
~_,  ~,  Xij < 1; Vm,t  (4) 
i~ lj~ Cmt 
Xij ~  {0, 1}  (5) 
where Cmt c  J  is the set of packages that contain slot sin, and Xij =  1 if demander 
i  receives package j  and zero otherwise.  A  slot can be included in  at most one 
package that is allocated. Each package can be allocated to at most one demander. 
Also, a slot cannot be subdivided but must be assigned in its entirety. A  schedule 
is efficient if it solves 
max ~  E  V,j Xij  (6) 
i~lj~J 
1 
Type  C 
View period  1  1  2 
Fig. 2. Users (6). 
User 
2  3  4 
C  P  P 
5  6 
A  M 
I  2 
C = contiguous, P =  periodic,  A =  array, M =  maintenance. Viewperiod 1  ~  usable slots ~  columns 
3,4,5,8,9,10;  Viewperiod 2  =  usable slots ~  columns 1,2,3,6,7,8. 172  J.O. Ledyard et al. /  Economic Design 2 (1996)  163-192 
subject to Eqs.  (4) and (5). 6 An efficient schedule achieves the  highest possible 
total  value  to  demanders of any  feasible  schedule.  Define  the  efficiency  of  an 
allocation X ~ as 
E  =  •  * 100  (7) 
where  E  is the efficiency and ~/  is the optimal value. 
4.4.  Parameters 
Although the  non-existence of market equilibrium prices for these  slot alloca- 
tion problems  is  of  interest and  important,  that  aspect  has  been  studied  in,  for 
example, Banks et al. (1989) and Bykowsky et al. (1995). In the research reported 
in this paper,  we  were interested in finding an acceptable mechanism which was 
much  better  than  the  existing  process.  We  therefore  focused  on  environments 
which were reasonably well-behaved. 
Our  experiments  were  conducted  using  two  sets  of  parameters  (valuations) 
which  differed  in  their  level  of  'contention'. The  contention level  gives  us  an 
indication as  to  how  much conflict between users  is  present in the  system.  Our 
measure of contention (following Olson and Porter (1994)) is 
EjE, ~ e, P, 
7  (8) 
where  V  is  the  value  of  the  objective  function  evaluated  at  the  solution  to  the 
maximization  problem  and  p~  is  the  equilibrium  price  of  slot  s,  as  defined  in 
Section  3.  The  levels  of  contention are  0.55  and  0.25  for  our  high  and  low 
contention conditions respectively. 
It can be verified from inspection of Tables  1-4, which contain the valuations 
and the  prices  for  all packages  and slots  for both  the  High  and Low  contention 
treatments  that  the  prices  are  indeed  competitive  equilibrium  prices  for  the 
parameters used in the experiment. 
5. Allocation  (scheduling)  mechanisms 
In this section we describe the general features of the three mechanisms whose 
performance we test in the environments of Section 3. The first mechanism we test 
6 This is a form of the problem  known in integer programming  as the knapsack problem.  The idea is 
to choose items to take in a knapsack when one goes on a trip. Each object has value, but it also has 
weight. The problem is to maximize  the total value of the items taken subject to the condition that the 
total weight is less than or equal to some constant.  This type of problem is NP-complete. The efficient 
allocation problem is more complicated, with one constraint  per slot and a number of packages (objects 
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Table 1 
Demanders' valuations: High contention condition a 
i  s~  Pj  Vii  pj 
l  3a  4a  5a  2450  2900 
1  3b  4b  5b  1450  1450 
*1  8a  9a  10a  3150  2000 
"1  8b  9b  10b  2150  1350 
"2  4a  5a  3200  1800 
"2  4b  5b  2000  1200 
2  8a  9a  10a  2000  2000 
2  8b  9b  10b  1000  1350 
3  3a  8a  1600  1600 
3  lb  6b  1600  1600 
*3  2b  7b  3200  1250 
3  3b  8b  1600  1600 
"4  2a  7a  3000  2000 
4  3a  8a  1500  1600 
"4  lb  6b  1750  1600 
4  2b  7b  1250  1250 
4  3b  8b  750  1600 
"5  3a  3b  3000  1350 
5  4a  4b  5a  5b  3000  3000 
5  8a  8b  1500  1850 
5  9a  9b  10a  10b  1500  1500 
"6  la  750  0 
6  2a  1000  1000 
6  3a  500  1100 
*6  6a  750  0 
6  7a  1000  1000 
6  8a  500  500 
6  lb  750  850 
6  2b  500  750 
6  3b  250  250 
6  6b  750  750 
6  7b  500  500 
6  8b  250  1350 
a The asterisks mark the packages  allocated at the optimum. The competitive equilibrium price of 
package j is given in the column labelled pj. pj is the sum of the competitive equilibrium prices of the 
slots comprising the package. 
is  designed  to  capture  some  of the basic  features  of the  current process  used by 
JPL  in  the  allocation  of  the  DSN.  It  combines  a  committee  process,  a  decision 
support algorithm, and a  bureaucratic appeals process.  While we would not expect 
this  mechanism  to  perform  very  well,  we  evaluate  it  to  provide  a  benchmark 
against which to judge the performance  of other mechanisms.  In particular,  since 
the  research  task  was  to  find  a  better  way  to  allocate  shared  resources  like  the 
DSN,  we  need  to  demonstrate  that  the  new  mechanisms  proposed  are  indeed 
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Table 2 
Demanders' valuations:  Low contention condition  a 
i  s~  Pj  Viy  pj 
￿9  "1  9a  10a  4000  11300 
1  9b  10b  850  850 
2  9a  10a  1000  1000 
"2  9b  10b  4000  850 
"3  la  6a  3250  1600 
3  2a  7a  1000  1000 
*3  2b  7b  2250  0 
"4  2a  7a  3250  1000 
4  3a  8a  1000  1000 
"4  lb  6b  2750  1600 
"5  4a  5a  4b  5b  3000  0 
5  9a  10a  9b  10b  1000  1850 
6  la  800  800 
"6  3a  1200  1000 
6  6a  800  800 
"6  8a  1000  0 
6  lb  800  800 
"6  3b  1000  0 
6  6b  800  800 
"6  8b  1000  0 
The  asterisks  mark  the  packages  allocated  at  the  optimum.  The  pj  indicate  the  competitive 
equilibrium prices of the packages, 
Table 3 
Competitive equilibrium prices for all slots:  High contention 
Resources  Time 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
a  0  1000  1100  1800  0  0  1000  500  1500  0 
b  850  750  250  1200  0  750  500  1350  0  0 
We test two alternatives to the current process. First,  we auction off the various 
slots  using  AUSM,  which  was  originally  designed  for  a  different  allocation 
problem by Banks et al.  (1989).  It is  an ascending bid auction which allows bids 
Table 4 
Competitive equilibrium prices for all slots:  Low contention 
Resources  Time 
I  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
a  800  1000  1000  0  0  800  0  0  1000  0 
b  800  0  0  0  0  800  0  0  850  0 J.O. Ledyard  et aL / Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192  175 
for packages of slots as well as for individual  slots. It also has a feature called a 
standby  queue  which  is  designed  to  help  bidders  overcome  the  'threshold' 
problem  common to  these  types  of combinatoric  problems.  This  mechanism  is 
described in more detail below. 
Although the  AUSM with  queue  generally  achieves  high  efficiencies,  it  also 
generally  extracts  significant surplus  from the bidders.  So what users  have been 
getting inefficiently,  but for free,  may now be allocated  efficiently but  at  a  real 
monetary cost to them. The net benefit to the users, which we call users'  surplus, 
can  actually decline  significantly  when  moving from a  committee process  to an 
auction  even  though  efficiency improves.  Proposing  such  a  mechanism  for  the 
DSN problem is politically untenable.  No mechanism which leaves current users 
significantly worse off will be adopted in an environment which values the users' 
opinions. 7  To  see  whether  we can  overcome this  political  constraint  we  test  a 
third mechanism which we call AUSM with tokens. We use the same mechanism 
as  above but we give all  users  an  allocation of tokens  with which to bid.  8 Our 
conjecture  was  that  while  this  mechanism might not achieve  the  same  levels  of 
efficiency that an auction with real monetary transfers would, it would still leave 
users better off because it would allow and provide incentives for users to identify 
tradeoffs but would not require them to pay additional funds. 
5.1. Negotiation (committee process) 
In this  section  we represent  the  process  currently  used  in  the  allocation 9 of 
DSN  slots.  We  keep  that  representation  in  a  form  that  can  be  implemented 
experimentally so that data on performance in a controlled setting can be acquired. 
The experiment is computerized, with each subject seated at his own terminal. The 
procedure occurs in three phases: 
Phase 1:  The Request Phase.  Demanders  submit requests  for packages of slots 
of the form (n, T, Q, R), where 
￿9  n  ~  { 1, 2 ..... 20} is the number of slots requested, 
￿9  T ~  {contiguous, periodic, array, maintenance} is the type of request, 
￿9  Q ~  {1, 2} is the quality of resource where a  is an antenna (resource) of quality 
1 and  b  is an antenna of quality 2, and 
￿9  R ~  {0, 1  ..... 9}  equals  the  range  of the  slots  requested  (the  range  equals  the 
number of the rightmost column (time) in the request minus the number of the 
leftmost column in the request). 
There is a  cost to each request  C(n, T, Q, R) which is decreasing in the range 
7 For more on mechanism design in which political constraints are important, see Ledyard (1993). 
s This approach has  sometimes been used in  practice with some success (measured by users' 
satisfaction surveys). Examples include scheduling business school interviews, managing computer 
allocations, etc. 
9 For a detailed description of the process used at JPL see Olson and Porter (1991). 176  J.O, Ledyard et aL/ Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192 
specified (flexibility) and increasing in resource quality  and the  number of slots 
requested. The function is 
C(n,T,Q,R) =  (3 -  Q)(15 -R)"  francs 
where  francs  are  the  experimental currency.  Although  there  are  no  direct  costs 
assessed in  the  current procedure at DSN,  there  are  important opportunity  costs 
since  large  and  inflexible  requests  lead  to likelihood  of conflict with  additional 
committee  time  required  and  potential  for  appeals  to  upper  management.  The 
function  C  is intended to capture these costs. 
Using the requests, a two-stage algorithm creates a schedule. The algorithm we 
used is the  actual algorithm (RALPH) used by JPL.  All requests  are included  in 
the  schedule.  The  algorithm minimizes the  'average' level of contention  for the 
resources  and  maximizes the  'average' level of resource  utilization.  In the  first 
stage it assigns  fractions of each request  made to every possible combination of 
slots  which  would  satisfy  the  request.  In  the  second  stage  the  requests  are 
consolidated so as to spread out the excess demand for slots as evenly as possible 
across slots. In other words, in two stages, it finds a solution to the following: 
min~]/max(~  ~  Xij, 1}}.  (9) 
Xij s~S~  ~'i~lj~C~t 
There  are  typically  multiple  solutions  to  Eq.  (9).  The  algorithm  selects  the 
schedule  based  on  the  order  in  which  the  scheduler  inputs  the  requests  from a 
mission  event  priority  guideline  provided  by  management.  Note  that  multiple 
demanders may be assigned to the same slot.  Conflicts from the multiple assign- 
ments of a slot are then negotiated in a user committee. 
Phase 2: The Negotiation Phase.  Once the algorithm has operated, there follows 
a negotiation phase. Here demanders may freely communicate and agree to drop or 
switch slots which they have been allocated. Although there is no direct restriction 
on the  number of switches,  all  negotiations have to be completed in  a  predeter- 
mined time interval, which  is known to all subjects.  A  demander's action in the 
negotiation phase may be either of the following: 
1.  A  demander may agree to unilaterally  give up her assignment to a  slot.  This 
may occur in the context of a binding agreement with other subjects who also 
agree to give up their assignments. 
2.  A  demander may give his  currently  assigned  slot to  another demander.  This 
could also form a part of a larger agreement with any number of other subjects. 
In  our  experiment,  the  experimenter  manually  alters  the  schedules  for  all 
subjects  from his  computer terminal  to  reflect  the  agreements  concluded  in  the 
negotiation phase. 
Phase 3:  The  Appeals Phase.  When  agreement  cannot  be  reached  on  the 
allocation of the schedule even after negotiation, the contending users can appeal 
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unresolved  after  the  negotiation  phase  are  settled  through  an  appeals  process 
which reduces the number of demanders in any slot to one. We sidestep the issue 
of the  preferences  of the higher level of management by conducting the  appeals 
process  anonymously on  the  computer  and  treating  all  of the  subjects  equally 
during  the process,  To capture the idea that larger requests  are more difficult to 
appeal,  we  require  that  a  separate  appeal  be  made  for  each  slot,  In  all  of our 
experiments the appeals process treats the appeals of all contending users equally, 
although this may not be the case at JPL or other organizations. During the appeals 
phase,  subjects  are required  to specify for every slot,  to which they and  at least 
one other demander are assigned,  whether they wish to be involved in the appeal 
process. There is a per slot cost to demanders who appeal, which was equal to 100 
francs in the experiment,  again to represent  the opportunity costs involved.  Each 
demander appealing for a slot has an equal probability of receiving the slot in the 
final allocation. No demander may make an appeal for a slot which is not assigned 
to him after Phase 2. 
At the end of Phase 3 an allocation is  determined and subjects receive profits. 
Demanders' requests  and appeals are unobservable to other subjects. Communica- 
tion between subjects is permitted only in the negotiation phase. 
5.2.  Adaptive  user selection mechanism (auction) 
The adaptive user selection mechanism (AUSM),  is a  computerized ascending 
price auction in which demanders enter bids for packages of slots. Alt slots and all 
packages are auctioned continuously and simultaneously.  (Also see Section 3.) A 
demander can enter an integer bid for any package,  to  Let  bij >  0 denote a bid by 
demander  i  for package j.  The process can be  most easily  understood using  the 
concept of a  standing bid.  Let  S  i  be the standing bid for package j.  At any time 
the  collection  of packages  for  which  there  is  a  standing  bid  will  constitute  a 
feasible  allocation. A  new bid,  b'ij, can become a standing bid if it is greater than 
the  sum of all  standing bids for all packages which contain slots  which intersect 
with package j. In other words  b'  d  is accepted and becomes a new standing bid  sj 
when 
b:s >  E  Sk.  (10) 
k;e~n P~*~ 
The  previous  standing  bids  S k,  where  k  is  as  defined  in  Eq.  (10),  are  then 
displaced and are no longer considered standing bids.  Bids can not be withdrawn 
once they are sent to the market.  An important feature of this  process is  that the 
lo It is important that demanders need not enter bids for all of the packages. Thus, in general, bidders 
in AUSM submit fewer bids than the number of commodities, making AUSM less demanding than 
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sum of all standing bids can only increase when a  new bid is accepted.  ~t  When 
the  auction  closes,  the  demander  in  possession  of the  current  standing  bid  for 
package j  receives that package. 
The auction was closed manually by the experimenter at random within a time 
interval known to subjects, although the exact time of closing was not known to 
them in  advance. The auction was open for 6-8  minutes in the early periods  of 
each  experiment and  4-6  minutes  in  the  late  periods.  The  random  ending  was 
designed  to prevent a  sudden  surge of bidding  activity at the end of the  market 
period which would occur if the exact time of closing were known to bidders.  ~2 
Also,  if at any time,no new bid was received for a  20  second time interval,  the 
market was closed by the experimenter. 
This  mechanism  as  it  stands  has  an  undesirable  feature  that  may  lead  to 
inefficient outcomes, because larger users  can prevent smaller but higher-valued 
users  from winning.  Suppose,  for example,  that  demander  1 has  a  valuation  of 
3000  francs for a package consisting of items  la,  2a,  and  3a,  demander 2  has  a 
valuation of 2000 francs for item la, and demander 3 has a valuation of 2000 for a 
package consisting of items 2a and 3a. In the highest-valued allocation, demander 
2  receives item  la and demander 3  receive 2a and  3a.  However, if demander  1 
bids 2001  francs for the package of la,  2a,  and 3a,  then neither demander 2  nor 
demander 3  can unilaterally displace  l's standing  bid without bidding  more than 
his individual value. Thus, the mechanism produces an inefficient outcome. 
To  overcome  this  threshold  coordination  problem,  a  feature  called  Standby 
Queue  for Unifying Individual Demanders (SQUID) was  added  to  the  Adaptive 
User Selection Mechanism.  13  This queue  allows individual  demanders to jointly 
submit bids in order to displace standing bids for large packages. A public bulletin 
board  is  provided  for  bidders  where  they  can  place  a  bid  that  they  would  be 
willing to have win but which is not sufficiently large to become a standing bid by 
itself. In the above example, a bid to pay 1300 for slot la by demander 2 would be 
such a bid.  Once placed on the standby queue, that bid can be used by others in 
concert with their own bid to displace a large bid such as the bid of 2001  for the 
package of slots  la, 2a and 3a by demander 1.  In the example, once demander 2 
has placed a bid in the queue, demander 3 can then choose to combine a bid of his 
own with demander 2's offer on the standby queue. He might then bid 702 francs 
for slots 2a and 3a in combination with 2's offer of 1300 for la. Since they jointly 
have  a  sufficiently  high  bid  to  displace  demander  l's  bid  they  can  do  so. 
11  It is, of course, possible for the standing bids of any particular package to fluctuate  over time. 
12 The experimenter drew closing times before the periods started using a random number generator. 
This allowed the  experimenter to be  sure that he  was unaffected by the  market activity  during the 
period when deciding when to close the market. 
t3 Tile  idea is to provide a forum for communication since experimental evidence suggests that the 
best way to overcome the threshold problem is to allow subjects to communicate. See Ledyard (1995) 
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Demander 3 can unilaterally execute the joint bid and 2's component is binding on 
2  once it is executed. Prior to execution, bids can be withdrawn from the standby 
queue.  Any number  of bids  could be  combined to form one joint bid,  with  the 
limitation that each bidder could have at most two bids on the  standby queue  at 
any time. 
5.3. AUSM with tokens 
The  AUSM  mechanism  with  the  standby  queue  was  also  implemented  as  a 
mechanism  where  bids  were  made,  not  in  terms  of an  experimental  currency 
convertible  to  U.S.  dollars,  but  rather  using  tokens  which  had  no  value  to 
demanders  and  which  served  only  as  a  medium  of exchange.  Each  demander 
received a budget of tokens at the beginning of each period with which to bid. Any 
tokens remaining at the end of the period had no value to the demander and were 
forfeited before the start of the next period. 
Since the  initial  distribution  of tokens  is  an important  aspect in the design  of 
any bidding mechanism which uses tokens, we included two subconditions in the 
research design, which differed only in the amount of tokens with which subjects 
were endowed at the beginning of each period. In the Equal Endowment condition, 
each subject received an equal endowment of tokens each period. In the Competi- 
tive Endowment condition, the endowment of tokens available to each subject was 
proportional to the minimum number of francs required by each subject to achieve 
the competitive equilibrium allocation.  14 In each of the four experimental sessions 
of AUSM/tokens,  each  endowment  was  used  for at  least  three  market  periods. 
Subjects  were  always informed if the  endowments  were  going to change  in  the 
next period.  Subjects knew their own endowment but not the endowment of other 
demanders.  Subjects  also knew that there were only two possible  initial  distribu- 
tions. The initial  allocations of tokens to subjects are given in Table 5. 
Although  some  of the  demanders  in  the  Competitive  Endowment  condition 
(demander  5  in  low  contention  and  demander  6  in  high  contention)  received 
endowments  much  lower  than  other  demanders,  they  were  nevertheless  usually 
able  to purchase  units,  since  there  existed  packages  for which  only they  had  a 
positive valuation. 
5.4.  Sequential  random  efficiency 
One  metric  by  which  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  a  mechanism  in  a 
particular environment is to compare the efficiency achieved to that generated by a 
t4 If the minimum was less than 5 francs, the endowment  given was raised to 5 francs. We recognize 
that in practice, the planner is unlikely to know the competitive equilibrium price vector, if indeed such 
a price vector exists. The Competitive Endowment treatment as used here should be viewed as a 
benchmark employed merely as an alternative to the Equal Endowment treatment. With two different 
endowments, we can gage the sensitivity of the efficiency of allocations and individual payoffs to the 
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Table 5 
Initial endowment of tokens 
Low contention 
Demander  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Equal endowment  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000 
Comp. endowment  1000  850  1600  1800  5  1000 
High contention 
Equal endowment  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000 
Comp. endowment  1825  1500  625  1800  675  5 
naive computer algorithm. This protects against claims of superior performance by 
a  mechanism  when  it  is  really  only  an  'easy'  environment  which  allows  high 
efficiencies.  The  algorithm we have  chosen is  a  generalization of the  sequential 
dictator algorithm analyzed in Olson and Porter (1994).  The algorithm consists of 
the following steps. 
1.  Pick a user. Each user is picked with equal probability. 
2.  Allocate to that user his most valuable package which is feasible.  A  package is 
feasible if no subset of it has been allocated to any other demander. 
3.  Go to  I.  if there exist slots which have not been allocated. 
4.  Compute F.iF~jVijXij  for that allocation, divide by  ~r 
The  algorithm was run  10000  times for each  set of parameters. The  results of 
the  first  2500  runs  are  depicted  in  Figs.  3  and  4.  The  algorithm  generates  an 
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Fig. 4. Distribution of efficiency  of random algorithm: 2500 trials - high contention. 
tions respectively,  with  standard  deviations of 0.0902  and 0.0876.  The algorithm 
results in the optimal allocation 28.94 and 2.25 percent of the time in the low and 
high contention conditions, respectively.  15 
6. Results 
All of the  12 experiments  were conducted in April  1993  at the Laboratory for 
Experimental  Economics  and  Political  Science  at  the  California  Institute  of 
Technology. Each experiment consisted of between  8  and  12 market periods.  All 
subjects  were  undergraduates  or  pre-freshmen  at  the  Institute.  In  Table  6,  we 
display some design information conceming the experiments: 
In  the  rows  corresponding  to  AUSM/tokens  in  the  column  labelled  Num. 
periods,  the  two  numbers  in parentheses  represent  the  number  of periods  in  the 
session where the Equal and the Competitive endowment conditions respectively 
were in effect.  16 
15 The algorithm generates, on average, higher efficiencies under low contention for our parameters, 
although, in general, higher contention does not always imply lower average efficiency. 
16 The instructions used in the experiments can be found Ledyard et al. (1994). 182  J.O. Ledyard et al./ Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192 
6.1. The data 
Our  analysis  of the  effects on  allocative efficiency  and  the  cost to  users  of 
varying the level of contention and of replication of the market conditions is based 
on the estimation of regression equations. The following equations were estimated 
using the data from the committee and the AUSM/money processes: 
yi=/3o+fllperiod+fl2hicon+~,  i=  1,2,  (11) 
where  Yl =  efficiency  (as  defined  in  Eq.  (7))  and  Y2 =  cost  to  users.  Users' 
surplus can then be computed as  YI -  Y2. The cost to users is the percentage of 
paid out by subjects during the market period. In the committee process it is equal 
to the request costs plus the appeals costs. For the AUSM/money the cost to users 
is equal to the amount of cash paid out by subjects to obtain their allocation. There 
are no costs to subjects in the AUSM/tokens. 
The  variable  'period'  is  equal  to  the  number  of  market  periods  that  have 
elapsed  in  the  experimental  session  including  the  current  period.  It  can  be 
interpreted as a variable which isolates the effect of the learning or experience of 
subjects on the value of the dependent variable. The dummy variable 'hicon' takes 
on  a  value  of  1 in  the  high  contention  treatments  and  a  value  of 0  in  the  low 
contention  treatments  and  therefore  identifies  the  effect  of  variations  in  the 
contention level. 
The following equation was estimated for the AUSM/tokens data: 
e =/30 +  fll period +/32hicon +/33compendow,  (12) 
where  e =  efficiency and compendow =  1 if the  Competitive Endowment condi- 
tion is in effect and equals 0 otherwise. For the AUSM/tokens data, since all rents 
go  to  the  demanders,  market efficiency is  exactly  equal  to  users'  surplus.  The 
Table 6 
Information about experimental sessions 
Exp. number.  Mechanism  H/L contention  Num. periods 
1  Committee  H  10 
2  Committee  H  9 
3  AUSM  H  9 
4  AUSM  H  I 1 
5  AUSM/tokens  H  8 (3/5) 
6  AUSM/tokens  H  11 (8/3) 
7  Committee  L  8 
8  Committee  L  10 
9  AUSM  L  10 
10  AUSM  L  10 
t I  AUSM/tokens  L  9 (6/3) 
12  AUSM/tokens  L  12 (7/5) J.O. Ledyard et al. / Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192 
Table 7 
AUocative efficiency and cost to users of the three mechanisms  (in percent) a 
183 
Dependent  variable  One  Period  Hicon  Compendow  R  e  n 
Efficiency -  committee  80.434  1.546  -  19.100  0.65  37 
(3.038)  (0.515)  (2.520) 
Efficiency -  AUSM/Money  85.916  1.324  - 3.096  0.20  40 
(3.398)  (0.486)  (2.634) 
Efficiency -  AUSM/Tokens  80.317  1.035  6.216  0.400  0.14  40 
(5.815)  (0.636)  (3.328)  (2.63) 
User cost -  committee  6.23  - 0.702  5.94  0.44  37 
(1.36)  (0.255)  (1.30) 
User Cost -  AUSM/Money  16.20  1.54  21.10  0.55  40 
(4.45)  (0.731)  (3.65) 
a Standard errors in parentheses. 
variable  'compendow'  identifies the  effect  on  efficiency of  varying the  initial 
endowment of  tokens.  The  results  of the  estimations of the  five  equations  are 
given in Table 7. The standard errors of the estimates are given in parentheses. 
Tables 8-10 contain the estimated efficiency and the estimated cost to users of 
each of the three allocation mechanisms in periods  1 and 10, as well as under the 
two contention levels. The numbers in Tables 8-10 are taken from the estimated 
coefficients in Table 7. L and H represent the Low and High contention treatments 
respectively. L1  and L10  denote the  estimated value of the  relevant variable in 
periods  1  and  10  respectively in the  low contention condition. The estimates in 
Tables 8-10 are the values of the regression in the relevant period and treatment, 
and not the actual observed values of the variables. Thus, it is possible, as in the 
low contention period  10  estimate of the cost in the  committee process,  that the 
estimated value could be negative although the actual costs must always be greater 
than or  equal  to  zero.  The figures  in parentheses  give  the probability  that  the 
efficiency or the users' surplus from the sequential dictator algorithm is less than 
or  equal  to  the  estimated  surplus  from  the  mechanism.  So  low  numbers  in 
Table 8 
Efficiency and user surplus: Committee  process (in percent) 
L1  L10  HI  H10 
Effic.  81.98  95.89  62.88  76.79 
(16.44)  (71.06)  ( 1.21  )  (25.77) 
Cost  5.53  - 0.79  11.47  5.15 
Users' surplus  76.45  96.68  51.41  71.64 
(11.84)  (71.06)  (0)  (10.1) 184  J.O. Ledyard et al./ Economic Design 2 (1996)  163-192 
Table 9 
Efficiency and user surplus: AUSM/Money (in percent) 
LI  LI0  H1  HI0 
Effic.  87.24  99.16  84.14  96.06 
(26.54)  (71.06)  (54.75)  (95.09) 
Cost  17.74  31.60  38.84  52.70 
Users' surplus  69.50  67.56  45.30  43.36 
(1.81)  (1.47)  (0)  (0) 
parentheses indicate poor performance by the mechanism relative to the sequential 
dictator (random) algorithm. 
The  efficiency  generated  by  the  committee  process  at  the  beginning  of the 
experimental  sessions is less than that generated by the random algorithm in both 
the  high  and  the  low  contention  environments.  In the  low  contention  condition, 
however,  the efficiency of the committee process improves over time  so that,  on 
average, it is better than the random algorithm by period  10.  However, in the high 
contention environment, the committee performs very poorly and,  even by period 
10, does not achieve efficiencies as high as the random algorithm. 
The  costs  to  users  in  the  committee  process  decline  with  time  as  users 
apparently  learn  to  avoid  these  bureaucratic  frictions.  Higher  contention  makes 
such avoidance more difficult.  The most remarkable finding is  that only in a  low 
contention environment  and  only after a  number of replications  does  the  current 
committee  process,  with  a  decision  support  algorithm,  outperform  the  simple 
sequential  dictator algorithm. 
From  an  efficiency  point  of view,  AUSM/money  performs  better  than  the 
committee in both the  high  and  the  low  contention conditions.  The efficiency is 
also  increasing  over time.  By the  tenth  period,  AUSM  significantly  outperforms 
both  the  committee  process  and  the  sequential  dictator  algorithm.  However, 
increases in efficiency are associated with increasing costs to the users so that user 
surplus  remains  unchanged.  In  fact,  users'  surplus  is  substantially  less  under 
AUSM than under the committee process or under the random algorithm described 
in Section 5.4. 
Table 10 
Efficiency and user surplus: AUSM/tokens/the  Equal Endowment Condition (in percent) 
L1  LIO  H1  HIO 
Effic.  81.35  90.67  87.56  96.88 
(16.44)  (57.25)  (72.71 )  (95,09) 
Cost  0  0  0  0 
Users' surplus  81.35  90.67  87.56  96,88 
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Under the  AUSM/tokens, efficiency and,  thus,  users'  surplus  increases  over 
time. The efficiency is higher under high than under low contention. Under high 
contention,  the  users'  surplus  was  largest  under  the  AUSM/tokens  mechanism 
than any of the three others. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 7, changing the 
token endowment had no effect on the efficiency levels recorded. This  is  some- 
what unexpected so it is reasonable to consider further the distributional effects of 
the  different token  endowments.  A  natural  measure  of this  effect is  the  sample 
variance of payoffs among the users which can be defined as 
s 2 =  E  (13) 
I-1  i=l 
where, S 2 is the sample variance, 7r;  is the profit of demander i, which equals the 
sum of his valuations (in terms of francs) for the packages he receives and ~"  is 
the  average  profit  of  demanders.  The  variance  is  analysed  by  estimating  the 
equation below. The estimates are reported in Table  11. 
S 2 =/3  o +/31period +/32hicon +/33compendow.  (14) 
One can see in Table  11  that the change in endowment also has no significant 
effect on the variance of the payoffs. The fact that the variances are not different, 
however, does not suggest that there were no distributional  differences under the 
two endowments.  For example,  under  low contention, demanders  3  and  4  were 
substantially worse off (payoffs were 15 and  19 percent lower respectively), while 
demander 6 was better off (by 19 percent) in the Equal Endowment condition than 
in  the  Competitive  Endowment  condition.  Under  high  contention,  demander  4 
received considerably higher payoffs (by 30 percent) in the Competitive Endow- 
ment  condition  while  demander  6  received  considerably  lower  payoffs (by  37 
percent).  Tables  12  and  13  show  the  percentage  of  market  periods  in  both 
subconditions in which each demander received each of the packages which had 
value to him. The columns labelled EE and CE indicate the percentage of the time 
that package  Pj  was  allocated to  demander  i  under the  Equal  Endowment and 
Competitive Endowment treatments respectively. 
Table 11 
The effect of the two endowments on the variance of payoffs across subjects a 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. error  t-stat 
one  3404260  788676  4.316 
per  -  167333  112328  -  1.490 
hicon  712256  600223  1.187 
compendow  275415  648072  0.425 
a R  2=0.08,  n=40. 186  J.O. Ledyard et al. /  Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192 
Table  12 
Allocated packages under AUSM/tokens under both endowments: High contention condition 
i  s ~  Pj  V/j  E.E. a  C.E. b 
1  3a  4a  5a  2450  0  0 
1  3b  4b  5b  1450  0  0 
*1  8a  9a  10a  3150  100  100 
*1  8b  9b  10b  2150  91  100 
~  4a  5a  3200  91  1130 
~  4b  5b  2000  91  100 
2  8a  9a  10a  2000  0  0 
2  8b  9b  10b  1000  9  0 
3  3a  8a  1600  0  0 
3  lb  6b  1600  9  25 
'3  2b  7b  3200  64  50 
3  3b  8b  1600  0  0 
"4  2a  7a  3000  82  100 
4  3a  8a  1500  0  0 
'4  lb  6b  1750  55  75 
4  2b  7b  1250  27  50 
4  3b  8b  750  0  0 
"5  3a  3b  3000  100  100 
5  4a  4b  5a  5b  3000  9  0 
5  8a  8b  1500  0  0 
5  9a  9b  10a  10b  1500  0  0 
"6  la  750  100  100 
6  2a  1000  18  0 
6  3a  500  0  0 
"6  6a  750  100  100 
6  7a  1000  18  0 
6  8a  500  0  0 
6  lb  750  36  0 
6  2b  500  9  0 
6  3b  250  0  0 
6  6b  750  36  0 
6  7b  500  9  0 
6  8b  250  0  0 
a E.E. = % of periods in which this package was received in the Equal Endowment treatment. 
b C.E. = % of periods in which this package  was received in the Competitive Endowment  treatment. 
Under both endowments and both levels of contention, each package except for 
package  (lb,  6b)  under  low  contention in  the  Equal  Endowment condition,  was 
allocated  efficiently (that  is  to  the  correct demander)  at  least  50  percent  of the 
time.  This  suggests  that  efficiencies under  both  endowments  are  high  and  not 
much  different from  each  other.  Under both  sets  of endowments of tokens,  the 
demanders with the highest valuations were generally able  to bid high enough to 
price out competing demanders. Even the very small endowments of demander 5 J.O. Ledyard et al./ Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192 
Table 13 
Allocated packages under  AUSM/tokens under both endowments:  Low contention  condition 
187 
i  s ~ Pj  Vij  E.E. a  C.E. b 
"1  9a  10a  4000  85  88 
1  9b  10b  850  8  25 
2  9a  10a  1000  8  12 
*2  9b  10b  4000  85  75 
"3  la  6a  3250  85  100 
3  2a  7a  1000  23  12 
"3  2b  7b  2250  100  100 
"4  2a  7a  3250  77  88 
4  3a  8a  1000  15  25 
"4  lb  6b  2750  38  50 
*5  4a  5a  4b  5b  3000  100  100 
5  9a  10a  9b  10b  1000  8  0 
6  la  800  15  37 
"6  3a  1200  85  75 
6  6a  800  15  0 
"6  8a  1000  85  75 
6  lb  800  62  50 
* 6  3b  1000  100  100 
6  6b  800  62  50 
"6  8b  1000  100  100 
a E.E. = % of periods in which this package was received in the Equal Endowment  treatment. 
b C.E. = % of periods in which this package was received in the Competitive  Endowment  treatment. 
under low contention and demander 6 under high contention were enough to allow 
the  user to  purchase  the  packages  which they  would receive in the  competitive 
equilibrium, because there were no competing demanders for these packages. 
Under high contention, demanders 1,  2  and 5,  who were in the same viewpe- 
riod,  usually received the  same allocations across the two  endowments. Deman- 
ders  3  and  4,  who  were  in  the  same  viewperiod  as  demander  6,  sometimes 
purchased  packages  meant  for  each  other.  Demander  4  had  a  much  larger 
endowment of tokens in the Competitive Endowment condition than demander 3 
who  in turn had  a  much larger endowment than demander 6.  Not  surprisingly, 
demander 4  received packages  (lb, 6b),  (2a,7a)  and (2b,7b) more  often  in the 
Competitive Endowment condition when he had a larger endowment. The mainte- 
nance demander 6 received the same packages less often when she had the smaller 
endowment. Demander 3 was able to purchase (lb, 6b) more often in the Competi- 
tive Endowment condition, easily outbidding demander 6,  who was never able to 
purchase  (lb,6b)  in  the  Competitive  Endowment  condition  but  was  able  to 
purchase it 36 percent of the time in the Equal Endowment condition. The average 
allocative efficiency under the two endowments was 0.937 and 0.953 for the Equal 
and Competitive endowments respectively. 
A  similar pattern occurred under low contention. The contiguous demanders 1 188  J.o. Ledyard et al. /  Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192 
and 2 usually divided packages (9a, 10a) and (9b, 10b) between them. Demanders 
3  and  4  often  received packages intended  for the  other,  with  4  receiving  more 
packages under  the  Competitive Endowment  condition,  when  his  token  endow- 
ment was  greater,  usually  at the  expense of demander 6.  Demander 5,  with  his 
very low  endowment in  the  Competitive treatment,  was  able  to  obtain  his  most 
preferred  package,  but  his  budget  was  too  low  to  obtain  the  other  package. 
Demander 6 was substantially worse off in the Competitive Endowment condition 
since  she  was  less  able  to  compete  in  the  bidding  with  demanders  3  and  4. 
Demander  3  was  sometimes  able  to  get  the package  consisting  of (la,6a)  and 
demander 4  received (3a, 8a) and (lb, 6b) more often. Efficiency was on average 
0.87 and 0.902  in the Equal and Competitive Endowment treatments respectively. 
7. Discussion 
The  effect of the  different treatments on  efficiency and  user  surplus  is  illus- 
trated  in  Fig.  5.  Under  low  contention,  the  Committee  process  provides  more 
surplus to users as a whole than the AUSM/tokens which in turn  provides more 
users'  surplus  than  AUSM/money. This  is  consistent with the  field observation 
that there is often little effort to replace committees with market-type systems of 
allocation when  conflict between  users  is  not  too severe even though  efficiency 
may be low. The committee process gives users  more surplus than the two other 
mechanisms even though it does no better than  the sequential  dictator algorithm. 
Under high contention,  however, AUSM/tokens yields the highest surplus  to the 
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AUSM//money.  The  committee  clearly  fails  when  the  level  of  contention  in- 
creases  since  the  cost  of negotiation  and  conflict  resolution  increases  and  the 
ability  of  the  mechanism  to  allocate  the  schedule  efficiently  diminishes. 
AUSM//tokens  behaves  in  the  opposite  way.  The  user  surplus  is  higher  when 
contention is high,  since the efficiency is higher  and user costs are zero.  Under 
both high and low contention, the AUSM/money, with its extraction of rents from 
the users, generates lower users' surplus than the other mechanisms. When highly 
efficient auctions such as AUSM are proposed by economists to solve allocation 
problems, we should expect such recommendations to encounter resistance from 
thoughtful future bidders in the auction. 
The  relatively  strong  performance of the  sequential  dictator  algorithm is  not 
surprising.  The  sequential  dictator  algorithm  has  aspects  which  give  it  a  good 
chance  to  enhance  efficiency.  One  is  the  fact  that  it  sidesteps  the  information 
revelation problem, by choosing for each  subject his  most preferred package. 17 
Our implementation thus assumed perfect information but the resulting allocations 
were compared against those generated by the interaction of strategic agents in an 
incomplete information environment. The efficiency of the  sequential  dictator as 
we  have measured  it  should  therefore  only be  treated  as  a  benchmark and  this 
paper should not be considered a test of its performance as a mechanism. 
From the standpoint of system efficiency, some of the mechanisms are superior 
to others. Under low contention, AUSM/money, the committee and the sequential 
dictator  algorithm  perform  better  than  AUSM/tokens.  Under  high  contention 
AUSM/money  and  AUSM/tokens  generate  more efficient  allocations  than  the 
random algorithm, which in turn had more efficient outcomes than the committee. 
This reinforces the findings of Banks et al. (1989)  that the AUSM  is capable of 
generating very high altocative efficiencies. 
There  is  evidence of improvement over time in  the  level of efficiency in  all 
three  of the  mechanisms.  The estimated efficiency level is  higher  in period  ten 
than in period one in all six conditions.  Cost declined in the committee as users 
seemed  to  learn  to  avoid  conflicts  over  time.  In  AUSM/money,  the  revenue 
extracted  from  the  users  increased  with  replication  of  the  auction,  and  rising 
revenue seemed to be related to increasing efficiency. 
Although varying the distribution of tokens in AUSM/tokens had no effect on 
total payoffs or on  the  variance of payoffs for the  particular parameters of our 
experiment, the distributions  of payoffs across subjects was different,  as deman- 
ders with lower endowments received lower payoffs. The robustness of this market 
efficiency finding should be interpreted with caution and does not suggest that the 
17 In the one-to-one assignment problem, such honest revelation is a dominant strategy. (See Olson, 
1991; Olson and Porter, 1994.) This is no longer true in this fundamentally  more complex many to one 
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initial distribution of tokens can be ignored by planners in field applications. The 
result does suggest, however, that there is some room for flexibility in varying the 
initial  distribution  of  tokens,  without  causing  large  fluctuations  in  a/locative 
efficiency. 
8. What have we learned? 
At the beginning of this  paper we presented a  stylized story to illustrate why 
user  committees might  be  able  to  survive  as  organizational  devices  to  manage 
shared  facilities  even though  it  is  widely  recognized  by both  the  users  and  the 
organization  that  significant  value  is  being  foregone.  Our  study  provides  new 
evidence supporting the foundations of this pessimistic view. However, our study, 
using the methodology of applied mechanism design, also establishes that there are 
viable alternatives to user committees that do not involve large losses in value to 
the users. This provides some evidence that significant increases in value, for both 
users and the organization, can be found and captured by using designed  mecha- 
nisms to improve the management of shared facilities. 
The basis for these somewhat sweeping statements can  be found in  three key 
findings  of our study.  We  split the  first finding  focusing on  the  performance of 
user committees into two parts. (la)  Experienced user committees using decision 
support  algorithms  produce  reasonably  efficient  allocations  in  lower  conflict 
situations.  The  key facts  supporting  this  observation  are  found  in  Table  8.  By 
period  l0  in the  low contention  environment, the user committees are achieving, 
on  average, 96%  of the maximum value with  virtually no cost to the  users.  The 
probability  that  the  user  committee  yields  a  higher  value  than  the  random 
algorithm is, however, only 71%, which is not good but is good enough to support 
the  continued  use  of  the  committee.  (lb)  Experienced  user  committees  using 
decision  support algorithms produce  reasonably  bad allocations  in  high  conflict 
situations.  The key facts supporting this observation are also found in Table 8. By 
period 10 in the high contention environment the user committees are achieving on 
average, 77% of the maximum value with a cost to users of 5% of the maximum 
value. The basis for describing this performance as bad is that the probability that 
the user committee yields a higher value than the random algorithm is only 10% in 
the  high  contention  environment.  There  is  obviously  significant  value  being 
foregone. 
The second key finding concerns the viability of an 'economic' solution for the 
recovery of the value foregone. We also split this into two parts. (2a) There is an 
economic  process,  called  the  Adaptive  User  Selection  Mechanism  (AUSM),  in 
which  users  bid  and  pay  dollars  for  time,  which  yields  high  efficiencies  in 
high-conflict  situations.  The  key  facts  supporting  this  observation  are  found  in 
Table  9.  In  the  very  first  period  and  in  the  high  contention  environment, 
AUSM/Money is achieving 86% of the maximum possible value. By period  10 in J.O. Ledyard et al. /  Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192  191 
the high contention environment it is achieving, on average, 96% of the maximum 
possible  value.  The  basis  for  calling  this  high  is  that  the  probability  that  the 
random algorithm would do better is only 5%. There is obviously significant value 
being created by this economic solution -  about a 25% increase in value over the 
user committee and, using a better measure of improvement, a  365%  increase in 
the probability of beating the random algorithm. (2b)  Because of the prices paid, 
the economic solution of AUSM /  Money leaves users significantly  worse off than 
user committees do. The key facts supporting this observation are found in Tables 
8 and 9. Looking at period 10 in the high contention environment, we see that the 
user committee leaves a users' surplus of 72% whereas, because of the payment of 
fees,  AUSM  leaves  the  users  a  surplus  of  only  43%.  Neither  is  particularly 
desirable,  since it is essentially a  sure thing (almost a  100%  probability) that the 
random algorithm would yield a higher surplus than AUSM. There should remain 
little mystery as to why user committees don't like market solutions especially in 
those high contention situations where they are most often espoused. 
The third key finding concerns the existence of better mechanisms for both the 
users and the organization. (3) There is a modification of AUSM in which tokens, 
or  internal  money,  replace  real  money  and  which  results  in  highly  efficient 
allocations without extracting any of the users' surplus. The key facts supporting 
this  observation  are  found  in  Table  10.  By  period  10  in  the  high  contention 
condition,  with  an  equal  allocation  of  tokens  AUSM/Tokens  is  producing  on 
average efficiency and users' surplus equal to 97% of the maximum possible. This 
is very high in the sense that there is only a 5% chance that the random allocation 
would produce a higher value. (A surprising and unexplained fact is that this is as 
high a gross value on average as AUSM/Money achieves.) 
We conclude with several policy thoughts. From the point of view of a planner 
interested in  achieving a high  aUocative efficiency, AUSM  is clearly the best of 
the mechanisms considered here. The efficiencies generated by AUSM are, in our 
view,  very high  considering  the  complex structure  of the  environment.  We  are 
doubtful that other mechanisms could do better although it surely remains an open 
research challenge to find a better one. 
From the point of view overall users' surplus, mechanisms can be found which 
surpass  AUSM/money.  When  contention  is  low,  it  seems  to  be  difficult  to 
improve upon the current committee process. None of our alternative mechanisms 
were  able  to.  This  may be why extensive conflict is  necessary before users  are 
willing  to  discard  committee  systems.  When  contention  is  high  we  find  that 
AUSM/Tokens  generates very high  surpluses for the users.  The tokens seem to 
provide enough information to coordinate the allocation of slots efficiently, yet the 
buyers do not have to give up any surplus. This effect was surprisingly robust to 
changes  in  the  initial  endowment  of  tokens.When  conflict  is  high,  it  will  be 
revealed  in  complaints  about  the  current  committee/negotiation process.  Under 
these circumstances, using a carefully designed auction with tokens may appeal to 
the users in a way that an auction using real money would not. 192  J. O. Ledyard et aL / Economic Design 2 (1996) 163-192 
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